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ABSTRACT
In recent times, DNS tunneling techniques have been used for malicious purposes, however
network security mechanisms struggle to detect them. Network forensic analysis has been proven
effective, but is slow and effort intensive as Network Forensics Analysis Tools struggle to deal
with undocumented or new network tunneling techniques. In this paper, we present a machine
learning approach, based on feature subsets of network traffic evidence, to aid forensic analysis
through automating the inference of protocols carried within DNS tunneling techniques. We
explore four network protocols, namely, HTTP, HTTPS, FTP, and POP3. Three features are
extracted from the DNS tunneled traffic: IP packet length, DNS Query Name Entropy, and DNS
Query Name Length. We benchmark the performance of four classification models, i.e., decision
trees, support vector machines, k-nearest neighbours, and neural networks, on a data set of DNS
tunneled traffic. Classification accuracy of 95% is achieved and the feature set reduces the original
evidence data size by a factor of 74%. More importantly, our findings provide strong evidence that
predictive modeling machine learning techniques can be used to identify network protocols within
DNS tunneled traffic in real-time with high accuracy from a relatively small-sized feature-set,
without necessarily infringing on privacy from the outset, nor having to collect complete DNS
Tunneling sessions.
Keywords: Network Forensics, Machine Learning, Predictive Models, DNS Tunneling, Protocol
Tunneling, Digital Investigations

1.

INTRODUCTION

Tunneling network traffic over the DNS
protocol for malicious purposes has been on the
increase in recent years. The Morto worm
(Open DNS Inc, 2011), Feederbot (Dietrich et
al., 2011), BerhardPOS (Valenzuela, 2015),
FrameworkPOS (AlienVault Inc., 2016) and
other similar malware variants evidence this
recent rising trend of stealthy network
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communication for malicious purposes (Open
DNS Inc, 2011). Such malicious activities
include exfiltration of sensitive data, hiding
network attacks and masking malware
communication often among botnets (Xu,
Butler, Saha, & Yao, 2013). The availability of
several free tools for performing DNS tunneling
(such as IoDine, NSTX, dnscat, DeNiSe,
Heyoka and OzymanDNS) (Omar Santos,
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2015) has also contributed to the increasing
use of this stealthy communication technique.
Network security mechanisms have been
built in an attempt to detect or prevent this
problem. Preventive measures such as firewalls
have been seen to be inadequate (Valenzuela,
2015). Detection mechanisms such as (Born &
Gustafson, 2010) (Farnham, 2013) and (Hands,
Yang, & Hansen, 2015) have also been
implemented; however, they also fall short,
mitigating only 3% of incidents among
sophisticated real world attacks (Valenzuela,
2015). Reactive methods, such as network
security monitoring and network forensics offer
some respite; however, they result in the
collection of large amounts of data. Firstly,
this bulk collection of network traffic data,
presents a problem of storage resources and
data privacy. Additionally, in order to uncover
malicious activity, this bulky data needs to be
analyzed in an investigative process, which is
manual, effort intensive and requires skilled
expertise (Davidoff & Ham, 2012). Current
industry standard network forensics analysis
tools only parse standardized network
protocols, and are not capable of dealing with
undocumented, or previously unseen network
protocols, thus resulting in manual analysis
and custom scripts being developed on a case
by case basis. All in all, this analysis, discovery
and reconstruction process is time-consuming
and has been seen to take around 7 months to
uncover malicious activity (Mandiant, 2015).
Innovative methods are needed to address
these combined challenges of storage space,
data privacy, and effort-intensive, timeconsuming manual analysis. To this end, we
explore the extent to which machine learning
techniques can be applied on smaller-sized, less
privacy intrusive feature-sets of DNS tunneling
traffic in order to uncover insights that can
contribute to network forensic investigations.
In the network forensic analysis of tunneled
network traffic, it is imperative to identify the

Page 80

carrier tunneling protocol, the internally
tunneled network protocol, the communicating
parties, the content being communicated and
its significance. Among large amounts of
network traffic, it is a challenging task to
uncover all these artifacts of interest. Within
our scope of DNS tunneling, we assume that
the identification of the carrier tunneling
protocol can be achieved with the DNS
tunneling detection techniques seen in (Born &
Gustafson, 2010) and (Farnham, 2013). We
thus focus on the next step of discovering the
network protocol that is being carried
internally within the DNS tunnel. To the best
of our knowledge there is only one other study
(Homem, Papapetrou, & Dosis, 2016) that
focuses on the discovery of network protocols
within DNS tunnels for forensic purposes. It
focuses on the prediction of only 2 internally
tunneled protocols (HTTP and FTP) and
makes use of a single entropy-based pattern
matching technique. Though an indicative
result of a 75% prediction accuracy is achieved
in that study, the dataset of 20 samples that it
is tested on is rather small.
Most currently available DNS tunneling
tools and techniques only employ encoding and
compression in their implementations, omitting
encryption for throughput and efficiency
reasons. This is due to the limited payload
length available in the DNS field (Query
Name) where the tunneled traffic is usually
carried. As such, for our study at hand, it is
worth noting that we do not focus on
identifying protocols within encrypted tunnels,
but rather we focus on identifying network
protocols that are compressed and encoded in
otherwise
exotic,
non-standard
or
undocumented techniques within DNS tunnels.
The main contributions of this paper are:
Novelty: We identify and demonstrate
how well-established predictive modeling
machine learning techniques can be harnessed
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for the identification of the internally carried
protocols within DNS tunnels in order to aid
the triage and analysis processes in digital
investigations. More concretely, we extend on
prior work (Homem et al. , 2016), by using 4
predictive modeling techniques (k-Nearest
Neighbours (k-NN), Decision Trees, Support
Vector Machines
(SVMs),
and Neural
Networks) on a larger DNS tunneling traffic
data set of 1. 7GB, containing 211 network
traffic samples. Compared to prior work,
(Homem et al., 2016) we also expand our
prediction task to 4 protocols (HTTP, HTTPS,
FTP, and POP3) , and explore a wider set of
features derived from a larger 1.7GB DNS
tunneling traffic data set. The specific features
are the DNS Query Name Entropy, the DNS
Query Name Length, and the carrier IP Packet
Length.
Effectiveness
Improved
and
Performance: From our results, it is seen
that our approach achieves a significant
improvement
m
predictive
performance
compared to the state-of-the-art, with Neural
Networks achieving the highest accuracy of
95 % and 5-NN the lowest accuracy of 90%.
The 3-parameter feature-set, derived from the
original raw network traffic data, also reduces
the size of the dataset from 1.7GB to 436MB ,
effectively providing a reduction of 74% in the
storage space required.
Applicability: Our findings indicate that
certain predictive modelling techniques, from
the area of machine learning, can be used to
identify network protocols carried within DNS
tunneled traffic. These allow for automated
prediction in real-time with high accuracy from
a relatively small-sized set of features, without
necessarily infringing on privacy from the
outset, nor necessarily having to collect
complete DNS tunneling sessions.

As a result of these insights from our work,
the effort of a network forensic analyst may be
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reduced in that particular network protocols of
interest to an investigation can be identified
quickly in an automated manner - without the
need for effort intensive, time consuming
manual
reconstruction
and
discovery.
Essentially, this can be used to automate data
reduction, as part of the triage phase (Rogers,
Goldman, Mislan, Wedge, & Debrota, 2006)
(Casey, 2013) (Marturana & Tacconi, 2013), or
the initial parts of the analysis phase of a
digital investigation. The aim of this is to
narrow down a large set of network traffic
evidence into the particular DNS tunneled
network traffic samples that contain the
specific network protocol of interest being
tunneled. Furthermore, privacy is preserved at
the initial stages, since only the chosen set of
features is used to identify DNS tunneled
traffic evidence samples of potential interest , as
opposed to manual reconstruction, which is
fundamentally invasive.
The rest of this paper is organized as
follows: In the following section (Section 2), we
explore related work. Section 3 explains the
details of our proposed method. The results
from the experimental evaluation are shown
and discussed in Section 4. Finally, in Sections
5 and 6 we present our conclusions and future
work, respectively.

2.

RELATED WORK

Studies aimed at classifying protocols within
network tunnels have mostly focused on
HTTP, SSH and SSL tunnels. In (Bernaille &
Teixeira, 2007) , the sizes of the first few
packets in an SSL session were subjected to a
clustering mechanism using Gaussian mixture
models to distinguish between when HTTP,
FTP, BitTorrent, eDonkey, SMTP or POP3
were being tunneled. Packet sizes, inter-arrival
times and packet arrival order were
statistically analyzed in (Crotti, Dusi , Gringoli,
& Salgarelli, 2007) to distinguish between
normal HTTP traffic and when other protocols
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were being tunneled over HTTP. The same
authors extended their work to distinguish
normal SSH and HTTP traffic from SSH and
HTTP Tunnels, respectively, as well as to
identify which sessions contained HTTP,
POP3, Chat and P2P protocols within the
respective tunnels (Dusi, Crotti, Gringoli, &
Salgarelli, 2009). Adaboost, C4.5 Decision
Trees, and Genetic Programming based
classifiers were used in (Alshammari & ZincirHeywood, 2011) to distinguish Skype and SSH
traffic from other traffic, as well as to identify
the type of application traffic (Shell, SFTP,
SCP , Local / Remote Forwarding or Xl 1) being
tunneled in the SSH tunnel. In (Song, Wagner,
& Tian, 2001) an attempt at inferring
keystrokes from SSH shell session traffic, is
made using Hidden Markov Models on packet
timing characteristics.
Outside the realm of network tunneling,
notably in (Hjelmvik & John, 2010),
identification of proprietary and obfuscated
protocols (such as Skype and Spotify) was
done using the Kullback-Leibler divergence on
various subsets of a 34 attribute feature-set.
Among DNS tunneling techniques, so far,
the focus has been on detecting the presence of
DNS tunneling among network traffic. Such
detection techniques are seen in (Born &
Gustafson, 2010), (Farnham, 2013), (Xu et al.,
2013) and (Ellens et al., 2013). Work on the
discovery of the network protocols carried
within DNS tunnels has only recently begun,
starting with manual deconstruction and
discovery of network protocols within DNS
tunnels, as is explained in (Davidoff & Ham,
2012). Automated discovery of the protocols
being tunneled within, has largely been
unexplored except for a single study (Homem
et al., 2016), that uses a pattern matching
technique (termed as M eanDiff) on a single
feature (packet entropy) to predict the
presence of HTTP and FTP traffic within DNS
tunnels. With this aforementioned study being
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the state of the art, we expand on it by using
additional features and by exploring more
robust, well-established predictive modeling
machine
learning
techniques
(k-Nearest
Neighbours, Decision Trees, SVMs and Neural
Networks) to improve the classification process
on a wider array of network protocols.
Our study aims to harness well-established
machine learning techniques to improve the
automated discovery of network protocols
hidden within DNS tunnels. This is done in
order to reduce the burden on forensic
investigators when faced with the task of
analyzing large amounts of network traffic.
When put into to practice, the techniques
shown in this study, serve as a quick
automated triage solution for narrowing down
and identifying traffic that may contain
particular protocols of interest that may
require deeper analysis. This helps forensic
investigators quickly focus their efforts on
pieces of network traffic evidence that have a
higher likelihood of being significant, while
excluding those that have a low likelihood of
containing the particular network protocol of
concern.

3.

lVIETHOD

In brief, our proposed approach entails
extracting only a subset of features (metadata)
from DNS tunneling traffic, and feeding this
subset of features into a given predictive
modeling technique to train it. Once training is
complete, given any subsequent DNS tunneling
traffic sample, the subset of features is
extracted, fed into the trained model, which
then identifies the network protocol within the
given tunneling sequence.
Given a DNS tunneling network traffic
sample, the specific features (metadata) that
we extract are: the IP Packet Length, the DNS
Query Name Length and the DNS Query Name
Entropy. The choice of using "lengths" of
certain packet fields as features is inspired
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through their prior usage in other similar
works, such as (Dusi et al. , 2009) and
(Alshammari & Zincir-Heywood, 2011). The
motivation for using the entropy of the DNS
Query Name originates from the importance of
this field in manual reconstruction of DNS
tunneling traffic (Davidoff & Ham, 2012) as
well as its usefulness in protocol prediction
seen in (Homem et al. , 2016). Entropy has also
been seen as an indicative numeric quantity in
identifying the contents of otherwise human,
non-readable content as is particularly seen in
the detection of DNS tunneling in (Xu et al.,
2013) and (Dietrich et al., 2011). Additionally,
these numeric features individually do not
uncover any personally identifiable information
contained within the network data traffic per
se, thereby promoting privacy to a certain
extent.
Once the 3 chosen features (metadata) are
extracted from the raw DNS tunneled traffic,
each
DNS
tunneling
sample
is
now
characterized by a small 3-parameter (feature)
representation, rather than the original bulky
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network traffic capture. This 3-parameter
representation could then be fed directly into a
predictive model for training or prediction.
We chose four commonly used predictive
modeling techniques for our study, specifically:
k-Nearest Neighbours (k-NN) (Batista, Wang,
& Keogh, 2011), Decision Trees (Rodriguez &
Alonso, 2004), Support Vector Machines
(SVMs) (Wu & Chang, 2004), and Neural
Networks
(Nanopoulos,
Alcock,
&
Manolopoulos, 2001). These four techniques
have shown prom1smg and competitive
performance within the area of network
protocol identification. For example, decision
trees (Li & Moore, 2007) and support vector
machines (Jing, Yang, Cheng, Dong, & Xiong,
2011) accurately classify internet traffic using a
small set of traffic features, while neural
networks have shown competitive performance
in predicting network traffic without access to
the contents of packets, against methods
requiring full packet payloads for classification
(Auld, Moore, & Gull, 2007).
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Figure 1. Method used for Developing and Testing Predictive Models for Network Protocol Prediction in DNS
Tunnels

In summary, our approach follows three
main steps as described below and depicted in
Figure 1:
1. Feature Engineering:
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Given a set of DNS tunneling traffic
packet
captures
(sequences),
our
technique extracts the IP Packet
Length, the DNS Query Name Length
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and calculates the Entropy of the DNS
Query Name of each packet in the
sequence of DNS tunneling packets.
The average value of each feature is
then calculated across a given packet
capture sequence. This serves as the 3parameter identifier summarizing a
given DNS tunneling sequence, whose
original structure could potentially
have contained tens of thousands of
packets making up the entire session, or
much of a larger part of it.
2. Model Construction:
Using the extracted features,
a
predictive model is generated through a
training phase performed using either
one of the aforementioned machine
learning techniques .
3. Protocol Prediction:
Given a new DNS tunneling traffic
capture sequence, the three features are
extracted on-the-fly, eliciting a 3parameter identifier for this traffic
capture
sequence.
The
trained
predictive model is applied on this,
resulting
in
a
class
prediction,
corresponding
to
the
underlying
tunneled protocol. In essence, the
model compares the characteristics of
the given 3-parameter identifier to its
internal model criteria and chooses
which class the identifier in question
belongs to.
One of the main benefits of this technique
is the significant reduction of the size of the
actual packet capture sequences to a single 3parameter identifier containing 3 numeric
values. The other significant benefit is that
once the training phase of the classification
model is completed, the classification process
for multiple tunneling instances can be done in
real-time. Additionally, since many machine
learning predictive models are adaptive, the
feedback of a new, previously unseen instance
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can help train the model for classification of
future instances. However, training need not be
done for each new instance, it can be
performed in a batch process outside the
classification procedure. This would allow for
on-demand instantaneous classification.

4.

EXPERilVlENTAL
EVALUATION

In order to implement and test our
approach, a dataset of DNS tunneling traffic
samples was collected and scripts written in
Python and the R statistical programming
language.

4.1

D ataset Collection

As there are no easily available real-world DNS
tunneling
labelled
datasets
(Stevanovic,
Pedersen, D'Alconzo, Ruehrup, & Berger,
2015) , due to their potentially sensitive nature,
we had to create our own. Scripts were written
in Python to generate and collect packet
captures of network traffic simulating normal
use of a set of network protocols running over
DNS Tunnels. The DNS tunneling tool that
was used to enable the tunneling process for
our purposes was IoDine (Ekman & Andersson,
2009). It was chosen due to its relative
popularity, readily available source code, and
its ease of setup and use.
The network protocols that were chosen to
run within the DNS tunnels were HTTP, FTP,
HTTPS, and POP3. The reason for using these
protocols was that they have also been the
candidate protocols in similar prior works such
as (Bernaille & Teixeira, 2007) and (Dusi et
al., 2009). Additionally, it helps us benchmark
HTTP and FTP discovery in DNS tunnels of
our technique against that seen in (Homem et
al., 2016), further expanding the body of
knowledge. POP3 and FTP are similarly terse
protocols in their vocabulary, and thus could
likely be mixed up with the technique in
(Homem et al. , 2016), while HTTP and
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HTTPS are a similar family of protocols
performing a similar task and could thus also
be easily mixed up in protocol prediction. An
extra bonus of using HTTPS was to see how
the tool would perform in the face of a
protocol that makes use of encryption.
The individual network protocols were
simulated in such a way to mimic normal
usage. HTTP and HTTPS protocol traffic data
was generated by visiting 5 random websites
sequentially. FTP was simulated through the
directory traversal and downloading of 5
random files from an FTP server. POP3
network traffic was generated through
requesting and downloading 5 random emails
from a mail server, where some emails
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contained plain text and others contained
randomly generated files as attachments.
The dataset itself comprises 211 packet
captures containing DNS tunneling traffic.
There were 53 samples of HTTPS, POP3, and
FTP respectively, while HTTP contained 52.
Table 1 summarizes the distribution of the
samples. The aim was to have an almost equal
distribution of the network protocols within
the dataset. The size of the entire data set was
1.7GB; however, after the process of feature
extraction, this was reduced to about 436MB.
The feature extraction is performed through
scripts that collect the aforementioned features
from each packet capture sample and store
them in JSON files - one file for each packet
capture sample.

Table 1
Distribution of the Protocols Tunneled over DNS

Network Protocol

# of Samples

Original Size

Reduced Size

HTTP

52

636.7 MB

176.9 MB

HTTPS

53

686.3 MB

181.4 MB

FTP

53

260.2 MB

49.8 MB

POP3

53

131.6 MB

28.2 MB

211

1714.8 MB

436.3 MB

Total

The Python scripts used for performing the
feature extraction are available online in a
Github Repository 1 . The reduced size feature
set is also made available online 2 for
comparison and verification purposes.

4.2

Setup

Using the R statistical programming language ,
we applied four machine learning predictive
modeling techniques on our reduced data set.
These were: k-Nearest Neighbours, Decision
Trees using the CART algorithm, SVM's using
a Radial Kernel function , and Multinomial
Neural Networks.
1 https: //github.com/ irvinhomem/ TunnelFeatureEx

tractor
https: //dx.doi.org/ 10.17045/ sthlmuni.4229399.vl

2
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In order to ensure non-biased training of
the models using these algorithms we employed
a 5-round repeated 10-fold cross-validation.
That is, the data set was split into 10 subsets respecting class distributions within each
subset - and 9 out of 10 of the subsets were
used in training the models, while the other
single subset was used for testing the classifier
model's performance. This is done for each
subset, leaving the other 9 out of 10 for
training. This procedure is repeated with 5
different rounds of selection for the candidates
of each subset. In this way over-fitting is
reduced.
Each machine
learning
classification
algorithm has several of its own tuning
parameters used to improve the classification
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accuracy. For example, for the Nearest
Neighbours classifier, k is one of the tuning
parameters, while for Decision Trees it is the
split criterion and threshold of each feature,
their order and the tree depth. SVMs and
Neural networks have numerous parameters
mainly related to feature weights and costfunctions, which cannot be explained here in
detail due to space limitations.
The tuning parameters for each algorithm
were explored via the versatility and
automated tuning facilities of the caret library
(Kuhn, 2013) available within R. To limit the
scope of this study we mainly focused on
collecting the tuning parameters that produced
the best results for each machine learning
technique, that is, those that resulted in the
highest classification accuracy. We also noted
the corresponding precision and recall values
in order to benchmark the performance of our
proposed three-feature method using the four
predictive modeling techniques, against the
competitor method MeanDiff that used a single
feature as proposed in (Homem et al. , 2016).
The M eanDiff method was run against the
same conditions as our proposed method with
our data set for the comparison of the
performance metrics.
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4. 3

Results & DisctisBion

For k-Nearest Neighbours, several values of k
were tested. The best accuracy for this model
was achieved with 5 nearest neighbours. Figure
2 depicts the accuracy of different values of k
and shows a peak accuracy of close to 90%
with 5 nearest neighbours. With Decision
Trees, the split criteria and their thresholds
were varied to adjust for best classification
accuracy. Figure 3 depicts the features and
their thresholds that resulted in the decision
tree with the highest accuracy of about 92%.
For the SVM classification model, the highest
accuracy was achieved with a Gaussian Radial
basis function with the Sigma hyper-parameter
set to 2.33809, a cost value of 1, and 86
support vectors. For the Neural Networks
model, a Penalized Multinomial Regression
function was used with a decay factor of zero.
The resulting performance measures of
prec1s1on, recall, and accuracy for the
prediction of the four candidate protocols using
the above models are summarized in Table 2,
averaged over the five rounds of crossvalidation. The performance measures serve as
a benchmark to evaluate the viability of our
technique.
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Table 2
Combined Per formance Metrics o• the four chosen Predictive Models against the competitor MeanD~ff
D e cision Trees
SVM
Multinomial
5-NN
M eanDiff
Classifie rs
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In summary, we observe that Neural
Networks provide t he highest accuracy of 95%
and 5-NN t he lowest accuracy of 90%.
Furthermore, all the 4 chosen machine learning
methods tested in this study achieve a
prediction accuracy of at least 90%. Precision
and Recall metrics for all algorithms are at
least 78% and above, with a majority being
over 85%. On average, t he Multinomial Neural
Network classifier produced t he highest
precision and recall when compared to all t he
other classifier algorithms. The competitor
method MeanDiff, despite the high recall
( 100%) for HTTP and FTP, seems rather poor
(precision and recall of 0%) in distinguishing
protocols of similar nature, i.e., HTTPS and
POP3, respectively.
The high performance of multinomial
neural networks may be attributed to the
flexibility of neural networks. However, this
comes at the cost of interpretability of the
model, as it is known to be difficult to
deconstruct and understand the cost functions
and weight assignments in developing such
models. SVMs suffer from this similar
drawback; however, k-NN and Decision Trees
produce more interpretable models as depicted
in Figure 2 and Figure 3.
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Among the results of our experiments, it
should also be noted t hat t he proposed
method, making use of only the 3-parameter
features-set, reduced the original dataset size
from 1.7GB to 436MB. This constitutes a
substantial reduction (by 74%) of the required
storage space, and by extension the amount of
data that needs to be processed.
Given the time-pressures, labour intensity,
scarcity of manpower and large amounts of
evidence to be sifted through in typical cases
today, it can be seen that a trade-off may be
made based on the accuracy and data
reduction capacity of our method in order to
attain the benefits of saving time, money and
labour. A forensic analyst may initially use our
proposed method using Multinomial Neural
Networks to achieve 95% accuracy of finding a
particular protocol within a DNS t unnel
instantaneously, as part of an automated triage
process, rather than spend long hours manually
reconstructing every network session of an
undocumented DNS t unneling technique. Also
with the significant space saving of about 74%,
costs of storage space and computing
processing power may also be saved by
extension. Also, since the feature set of the
evidence is smaller, processing and data
transfer times naturally should also be faster
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on the feature set as opposed to the larger
original evidence data set.

5.

CONCLUSIONS

In this study, we proposed the idea of using
predictive
modeling
machine
learning
algorithms as a means to assist in the process
of network forensic investigations of DNS
tunnels . More specifically, we presented a
method to predict network protocols carried
within DNS tunnels, using only a small subset
of metadata of the actual network traffic
evidence. The aim of this is to assist network
forensic practitioners in the early phases of an
investigation to quickly triage and identify
particular DNS tunneling traffic samples that
are more likely to contain certain network
protocols of interest to an investigation, and
discard others without having to manually
reconstruct and dissect all the packets. In this
way, they can narrow down the evidence data
set in an automated manner in order to focus
their analysis efforts.
To this end, we developed a method that
extracts metadata (features) from DNS
tunneling traffic samples, feeding only these
features into machine learning algorithms, to
predict the network protocol contained within
a specific DNS tunneling traffic sample. This
method was evaluated using 4 well established
machine learning algorithms, and their
performance benchmarked against the state-ofthe art.
The results showed that our technique can
predict network protocols within DNS
tunneling traffic with an accuracy of between
90-95% and with Precision and Recall values
generally
above
80%.
This
indicates
significantly positive results with our 3-feature
metadata subset and a markedly improved
performance against the state-of-the art. Thus,
using our technique an investigator can be
directed in an automated manner with high
certainty towards focusing their investigative
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efforts on a smaller subset that is more likely
to yield results.
Another benefit of our technique is that it
can also identify network protocols within DNS
tunnels without the need to collect complete
DNS tunneling sessions, as is the case with
manual reconstruction via decoding and
decompression. Furthermore, storage and
processing power may be saved in using the
smaller feature set that is shown to take up
74% less space than the original network traffic
evidence set.
Our technique also
privacy as the network
technique is performed
which does not expose
information, per se.

6.

affords an amount of
protocol identification
on numeric metadata
personally identifiable

FUTUREWORK

Though the results of this study are
significantly positive, there still remain
improvements that can be made. For one, the
use of different feature sets from the tunneled
data can be considered. We manually selected
the chosen features based on prior knowledge
of their importance, with the indication of
manual feature selection being common in
related work. Automated feature selection
techniques can also be studied as a future
research direction, if a reasonably large feature
set can be realized. There are possibly other
features that may improve the classification
performance. The application of alternative
machine learning techniques, such as random
forests, can also be considered as an avenue of
future work that may improve the overall
prediction performance.
As earlier mentioned, the next step in a
network forensic investigation would be to
identify the content being transmitted by the
protocols within the DNS tunnel. A feature
(metadata )-based prediction mechanism to
identify specific DNS Tunneling traffic samples
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with particular types of content could also be
explored as a natural progression for future
work from this study.
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